Section 264 is the assessee-friendly mirror of section 263. Where s. 263 empowers PCIT/CIT to revise erroneous-and-prejudicial orders (revenue's favour), s. 264 empowers PCIT/CIT to revise on assessee's application — but only downward, never to assessee's prejudice. The provision provides a residual administrative remedy for omissions and bona-fide errors.
The 1-year limitation under s. 264(2)/(3) is strict — both for suo-motu revision and assessee's application. Beyond 1 year, the only remedy is Article 226 writ on grounds of manifest illegality or jurisdictional error. Practitioner discipline: track 1-year clock from communication of every order to preserve s. 264 option.
Section 264(4) creates a strict mutual-exclusion with the appellate route — where appeal lies but has not been made and limitation has not expired, or where appeal is pending or has been made, s. 264 is barred. This prevents forum-shopping and ensures that the assessee chooses between adjudicatory (CIT(A)/ITAT) and administrative (PCIT s. 264) routes.
The transition to the Income-tax Act, 2025 preserves the appellate and revisional architecture; pending appeals continue under section 536.
FINANCE ACT AMENDMENT TIMELINE
■ FA 1922 — Original assessee-revision provision.
■ FA 1961 — Section 264 codified.
■ FA 1989 — Conforming changes for new appellate framework.
■ FA 1998 — Procedural updates with s. 260A insertion.
■ FA 2014 — Section 264A faceless framework foundation.
■ FA 2020 — Faceless Revision Scheme — operationalised.
Facts. The Department sought to apply a surcharge provision retrospectively to block-period assessments. The assessee contended that the amendment was substantive and could not have retrospective operation absent express legislative direction.
Issue. Whether amendments to taxing statutes operate prospectively unless the legislature has expressly or by necessary implication conferred retrospective effect.
HELD. The Constitution Bench reaffirmed the general rule against retrospectivity of taxing statutes. A taxing provision must be construed prospectively unless the language compels otherwise; mere insertion or substitution by amendment is not sufficient to deny vested rights.
“Of the various rules guiding how a legislation has to be interpreted, one established rule is that unless a contrary intention appears, a legislation is presumed not to be intended to have a retrospective operation.”
Relevance. Anchor authority for any argument that an amendment to a charging or computational provision must apply only from the AY notified — useful in transitional disputes around FA 2025 and the 1961 → 2025 changeover.
▸ Mathuram Agrawal v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1999) 8 SCC 667 ; (2000) 1 SCR 1 (Supreme Court)
Facts. A municipal levy was challenged on the ground that the charging provision did not clearly specify the rate, the persons charged, and the measure of tax.
Issue. Whether a tax can be imposed in the absence of a clear, unambiguous charging provision identifying the subject, measure, rate, and incidence.
HELD. Article 265 demands that tax be levied only by clear authority of law. The four components — taxable event, person, rate, and measure — must be clearly discernible from the charging provision; ambiguity is fatal to the levy.
“The intention of the Legislature in a taxation statute is to be gathered from the language of the provisions, particularly when the language is plain and unambiguous. In a taxing Act it is not possible to assume any intention or governing purpose other than what is given expression to.”
Relevance. Foundational authority on the rigour required of charging sections — underpins arguments that ambiguous deeming fictions, surcharge formulas, and rate prescriptions must be strictly construed.
Facts. Section 52(2) (since deleted) deemed sale consideration to be FMV where FMV exceeded the declared consideration by 15%. The Department applied it on a literal reading even when the assessee had not in fact received more than the declared price.
Issue. Whether a deeming provision in a charging schema can be construed literally where its plain reading produces a result manifestly contrary to legislative object.
HELD. The Court read down section 52(2) to apply only where the assessee had actually received consideration in excess of the declared sum. A literal construction yielding absurd or unjust results must yield to an object-based interpretation; the CBDT's contemporaneous Circular No. 96 was held binding on the Revenue.
“It is well settled that a literal construction of a statutory provision ought not to be adopted if it produces a manifestly unjust result… Where a literal construction creates an anomaly, the courts will adopt that construction which avoids the anomaly.”
Relevance. Anchor authority for purposive construction of deeming fictions across the 1961 Act — applies wherever a deeming clause (e.g., s. 50C, s. 56(2)(x), s. 2(22)(e)) yields a result contrary to legislative purpose.
▸ Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. v. Income-tax Officer, Companies District I, Calcutta (1961) 41 ITR 191 ; AIR 1961 SC 372 (Supreme Court — Constitution Bench)
Facts. The assessee challenged a section 34 reassessment notice on the ground that the ITO had no jurisdictional foundation to reopen; the Revenue contended that the writ jurisdiction was ousted by the statutory appeals scheme.
Issue. Whether the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 226 is ousted by the existence of a statutory remedy where the reassessment notice itself lacks jurisdictional foundation.
HELD. Existence of an alternative statutory remedy does not oust Article 226 jurisdiction where the impugned action is wholly without jurisdiction. The burden is on the assessee to disclose all primary facts; the duty to draw inferences rests with the assessing officer.
“The duty of the assessee in every case is to disclose fully and truly all primary facts. Once all primary facts are before the assessing authority, he requires no further assistance by way of disclosure.”
Relevance. Foundational on the boundary between assessee's disclosure duty and the ITO's investigative duty — supports challenges to s. 147/148 (1961) / s. 281 (2025) reassessments on jurisdictional grounds.
▸ Commissioner of Income-tax v. Reliance Petroproducts (P) Ltd. (2010) 322 ITR 158 ; (2010) 11 SCC 762 (Supreme Court)
Facts. The assessee claimed deduction of interest on borrowings used for investment in shares yielding tax-free dividend. The deduction was disallowed under section 14A. The Department levied penalty under section 271(1)(c) for concealment / inaccurate particulars.
Issue. Whether a mere disallowance of a deduction — without any falsehood in the particulars furnished — attracts penalty under section 271(1)(c).
HELD. Penalty under section 271(1)(c) is not attracted merely because a claim for deduction is disallowed. The assessee's claim must be shown to be false, frivolous, or made without bona fides; mere unsustainability does not amount to concealment or furnishing of inaccurate particulars.
“A mere making of the claim, which is not sustainable in law, by itself, will not amount to furnishing inaccurate particulars regarding the income of the assessee. Such claim made in the Return cannot amount to inaccurate particulars.”
Relevance. Cornerstone authority for resisting penalty under section 271(1)(c) / section 270A — applies to disallowed deductions, transfer-pricing adjustments, head-of-income re-characterisations where a bona-fide claim was made.
CBDT CIRCULARS — ECOSYSTEM
▸ CBDT Circular No. 14(XL-35) of 1955 dated 11 April 1955
Subject. Duty of officers to assist assessees in claiming and securing relief
Substance. Foundational circular directing that the AO should not exploit assessee ignorance to deny legitimate reliefs; officer is required to draw attention to refunds or reliefs to which the assessee is entitled. The circular has been judicially noted in several appellate decisions and remains operative for first-appellate practice.
Substance. Explained the FA 1987 / FA 1989 amendments unifying the previous year with the financial year preceding the AY, including transitional provisions for assessees with different accounting years. Useful in any controversy on the timing of accrual / chargeability for early post-1989 AYs.
▸ CBDT Circular No. 5 of 2014 dated 11 February 2014
Subject. Section 14A — dis-allowance even where no exempt income earned (since modulated)
Substance. Initially directed AOs to apply Rule 8D disallowance under section 14A even where no exempt income was earned in the year; subsequently modulated by Cheminvest (Del HC) and Maxopp (SC). FA 2022 amendment to section 14A re-asserted the position but remains under litigation.
▸ CBDT Circular No. 6 of 2019 dated 20 March 2019
Subject. Withdrawal of low-tax-effect appeals — monetary thresholds
Substance. Revised monetary thresholds for departmental appeals — ITAT (Rs 50L), HC (Rs 1 Cr), SC (Rs 2 Cr); subsequently further revised. Operates as a non-statutory limitation on the Revenue's appellate engagement, binding under section 119.
Substance. Procedural guidance for AOs handling transitional reassessment notices for AYs 2013-14 to 2017-18 affected by Ashish Agarwal and Rajeev Bansal. Sets out the form of section 148A inquiry, time-bar calculation under TOLA, and JAO/FAO jurisdiction in faceless cases.
WORKED EXAMPLES
Illustration — Illustration 1
Facts. Assessee discovers mistake in completed assessment — wishes to claim missed deduction.
Computation.
Section 264 — assessee-friendly revision within 1 year of order.
File application; PCIT/CIT can revise downward (favourable).
No upward prejudice permitted under s.
264(1) — 'not being prejudicial'.
Result. Application for downward revision under s. 264.
Illustration — Illustration 2
Facts. Assessee filed appeal to CIT(A); now wishes to invoke s. 264 instead.
Computation.
Section 264(4)(b) — bar where appeal pending.
Withdraw appeal first (if procedurally permissible); then file s.
STATUTORY ARCHITECTURE — 18-ROW MAP
01. Section & marginal note
Section 264 — Revision on Assessee's Application — Chapter XX (Appeals and Revision).
02. Sub-section structure
As per operative text — typically appellate jurisdiction + powers + procedure.
03. Operative trigger
Adverse order by lower authority — assessment / penalty / rectification / reassessment.
04. Persons affected
Assessee (or revenue, where appellate jurisdiction extends to Department appeals).
05. Time anchor — limitation
Per section — typically 30 days (CIT(A)) / 60 days (ITAT) / 120 days (HC) / 90 days (SC SLP).
06. Income anchor
Income-tax / wealth-tax / interest / penalty — disputed quantum.
07. Residential-status nexus
Applies uniformly to residents / non-residents / corporates / firms / AOP.
08. Rate / charge mechanism
Disputed tax + interest + penalty under challenge.
09. TDS / TCS interaction
TDS-default orders u/s 201 separately appealable.
10. Advance-tax obligation
Continues regardless of appellate pendency — section 220(6) discretionary stay.
11. Presumptive provisions
Presumptive-regime cases follow same appellate ladder.
12. Exemption / deduction mechanism
Exemption / deduction disputes routinely appealed.
13. Refund / credit
Refund consequent to appellate relief — section 244A interest.
14. Return / disclosure reporting
Memorandum of appeal + grounds + statement of facts + paper-book.
15. Penalty exposure
Concealment / under-reporting penalty orders also appealable to CIT(A)/ITAT.
16. Prosecution exposure
Prosecution sanction u/s 279 — separate criminal proceedings.
17. Cross-statute interplay
Article 226/227 writ jurisdiction (Calcutta Discount); Civil Procedure Code analogy.
18. Repeal & saving — 1961 → 2025
Section 536 saves pending appeals; 2025 Act preserves appellate framework.
HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Section 264 is the assessee-friendly mirror of section 263. Where s. 263 empowers PCIT/CIT to revise erroneous-and-prejudicial orders (revenue's favour), s. 264 empowers PCIT/CIT to revise on assessee's application — but only downward, never to assessee's prejudice. The provision provides a residual administrative remedy for omissions and bona-fide errors.
The 1-year limitation under s. 264(2)/(3) is strict — both for suo-motu revision and assessee's application. Beyond 1 year, the only remedy is Article 226 writ on grounds of manifest illegality or jurisdictional error. Practitioner discipline: track 1-year clock from communication of every order to preserve s. 264 option.
Section 264(4) creates a strict mutual-exclusion with the appellate route — where appeal lies but has not been made and limitation has not expired, or where appeal is pending or has been made, s. 264 is barred. This prevents forum-shopping and ensures that the assessee chooses between adjudicatory (CIT(A)/ITAT) and administrative (PCIT s. 264) routes.
The transition to the Income-tax Act, 2025 preserves the appellate and revisional architecture; pending appeals continue under section 536.
FINANCE ACT AMENDMENT TIMELINE
■ FA 1922 — Original assessee-revision provision.
■ FA 1961 — Section 264 codified.
■ FA 1989 — Conforming changes for new appellate framework.
■ FA 1998 — Procedural updates with s. 260A insertion.
■ FA 2014 — Section 264A faceless framework foundation.
■ FA 2020 — Faceless Revision Scheme — operationalised.
■ FA 2022 — JCIT(A) tier; conforming changes.
■ FA 2024 — Procedural updates.
■ ITA 2025 — Assessee revision preserved.
JUDICIAL EVOLUTION — VERIFIED LANDMARK AUTHORITIES
▸ Commissioner of Income-tax v. Vatika Township Pvt. Ltd. (2014) 367 ITR 466 ; (2015) 1 SCC 1 (Supreme Court — 5-Judge Constitution Bench)
Facts. The Department sought to apply a surcharge provision retrospectively to block-period assessments. The assessee contended that the amendment was substantive and could not have retrospective operation absent express legislative direction.
Issue. Whether amendments to taxing statutes operate prospectively unless the legislature has expressly or by necessary implication conferred retrospective effect.
HELD. The Constitution Bench reaffirmed the general rule against retrospectivity of taxing statutes. A taxing provision must be construed prospectively unless the language compels otherwise; mere insertion or substitution by amendment is not sufficient to deny vested rights.
“Of the various rules guiding how a legislation has to be interpreted, one established rule is that unless a contrary intention appears, a legislation is presumed not to be intended to have a retrospective operation.”
Relevance. Anchor authority for any argument that an amendment to a charging or computational provision must apply only from the AY notified — useful in transitional disputes around FA 2025 and the 1961 → 2025 changeover.
▸ Mathuram Agrawal v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1999) 8 SCC 667 ; (2000) 1 SCR 1 (Supreme Court)
Facts. A municipal levy was challenged on the ground that the charging provision did not clearly specify the rate, the persons charged, and the measure of tax.
Issue. Whether a tax can be imposed in the absence of a clear, unambiguous charging provision identifying the subject, measure, rate, and incidence.
HELD. Article 265 demands that tax be levied only by clear authority of law. The four components — taxable event, person, rate, and measure — must be clearly discernible from the charging provision; ambiguity is fatal to the levy.
“The intention of the Legislature in a taxation statute is to be gathered from the language of the provisions, particularly when the language is plain and unambiguous. In a taxing Act it is not possible to assume any intention or governing purpose other than what is given expression to.”
Relevance. Foundational authority on the rigour required of charging sections — underpins arguments that ambiguous deeming fictions, surcharge formulas, and rate prescriptions must be strictly construed.
▸ K.P. Varghese v. Income-tax Officer, Ernakulam (1981) 131 ITR 597 ; (1981) 4 SCC 173 (Supreme Court — 3-Judge Bench)
Facts. Section 52(2) (since deleted) deemed sale consideration to be FMV where FMV exceeded the declared consideration by 15%. The Department applied it on a literal reading even when the assessee had not in fact received more than the declared price.
Issue. Whether a deeming provision in a charging schema can be construed literally where its plain reading produces a result manifestly contrary to legislative object.
HELD. The Court read down section 52(2) to apply only where the assessee had actually received consideration in excess of the declared sum. A literal construction yielding absurd or unjust results must yield to an object-based interpretation; the CBDT's contemporaneous Circular No. 96 was held binding on the Revenue.
“It is well settled that a literal construction of a statutory provision ought not to be adopted if it produces a manifestly unjust result… Where a literal construction creates an anomaly, the courts will adopt that construction which avoids the anomaly.”
Relevance. Anchor authority for purposive construction of deeming fictions across the 1961 Act — applies wherever a deeming clause (e.g., s. 50C, s. 56(2)(x), s. 2(22)(e)) yields a result contrary to legislative purpose.
▸ Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. v. Income-tax Officer, Companies District I, Calcutta (1961) 41 ITR 191 ; AIR 1961 SC 372 (Supreme Court — Constitution Bench)
Facts. The assessee challenged a section 34 reassessment notice on the ground that the ITO had no jurisdictional foundation to reopen; the Revenue contended that the writ jurisdiction was ousted by the statutory appeals scheme.
Issue. Whether the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 226 is ousted by the existence of a statutory remedy where the reassessment notice itself lacks jurisdictional foundation.
HELD. Existence of an alternative statutory remedy does not oust Article 226 jurisdiction where the impugned action is wholly without jurisdiction. The burden is on the assessee to disclose all primary facts; the duty to draw inferences rests with the assessing officer.
“The duty of the assessee in every case is to disclose fully and truly all primary facts. Once all primary facts are before the assessing authority, he requires no further assistance by way of disclosure.”
Relevance. Foundational on the boundary between assessee's disclosure duty and the ITO's investigative duty — supports challenges to s. 147/148 (1961) / s. 281 (2025) reassessments on jurisdictional grounds.
▸ Commissioner of Income-tax v. Reliance Petroproducts (P) Ltd. (2010) 322 ITR 158 ; (2010) 11 SCC 762 (Supreme Court)
Facts. The assessee claimed deduction of interest on borrowings used for investment in shares yielding tax-free dividend. The deduction was disallowed under section 14A. The Department levied penalty under section 271(1)(c) for concealment / inaccurate particulars.
Issue. Whether a mere disallowance of a deduction — without any falsehood in the particulars furnished — attracts penalty under section 271(1)(c).
HELD. Penalty under section 271(1)(c) is not attracted merely because a claim for deduction is disallowed. The assessee's claim must be shown to be false, frivolous, or made without bona fides; mere unsustainability does not amount to concealment or furnishing of inaccurate particulars.
“A mere making of the claim, which is not sustainable in law, by itself, will not amount to furnishing inaccurate particulars regarding the income of the assessee. Such claim made in the Return cannot amount to inaccurate particulars.”
Relevance. Cornerstone authority for resisting penalty under section 271(1)(c) / section 270A — applies to disallowed deductions, transfer-pricing adjustments, head-of-income re-characterisations where a bona-fide claim was made.
CBDT CIRCULARS — ECOSYSTEM
▸ CBDT Circular No. 14(XL-35) of 1955 dated 11 April 1955
Subject. Duty of officers to assist assessees in claiming and securing relief
Substance. Foundational circular directing that the AO should not exploit assessee ignorance to deny legitimate reliefs; officer is required to draw attention to refunds or reliefs to which the assessee is entitled. The circular has been judicially noted in several appellate decisions and remains operative for first-appellate practice.
▸ CBDT Circular No. 549 dated 31 October 1989
Subject. Explanatory notes — Finance Act 1989 amendments (incl. PY unification)
Substance. Explained the FA 1987 / FA 1989 amendments unifying the previous year with the financial year preceding the AY, including transitional provisions for assessees with different accounting years. Useful in any controversy on the timing of accrual / chargeability for early post-1989 AYs.
▸ CBDT Circular No. 5 of 2014 dated 11 February 2014
Subject. Section 14A — dis-allowance even where no exempt income earned (since modulated)
Substance. Initially directed AOs to apply Rule 8D disallowance under section 14A even where no exempt income was earned in the year; subsequently modulated by Cheminvest (Del HC) and Maxopp (SC). FA 2022 amendment to section 14A re-asserted the position but remains under litigation.
▸ CBDT Circular No. 6 of 2019 dated 20 March 2019
Subject. Withdrawal of low-tax-effect appeals — monetary thresholds
Substance. Revised monetary thresholds for departmental appeals — ITAT (Rs 50L), HC (Rs 1 Cr), SC (Rs 2 Cr); subsequently further revised. Operates as a non-statutory limitation on the Revenue's appellate engagement, binding under section 119.
▸ CBDT Circular No. 5 of 2024 dated 15 March 2024
Subject. Procedure for transitional reassessment notices post-Ashish Agarwal / Rajeev Bansal
Substance. Procedural guidance for AOs handling transitional reassessment notices for AYs 2013-14 to 2017-18 affected by Ashish Agarwal and Rajeev Bansal. Sets out the form of section 148A inquiry, time-bar calculation under TOLA, and JAO/FAO jurisdiction in faceless cases.
WORKED EXAMPLES
Illustration — Illustration 1
Facts. Assessee discovers mistake in completed assessment — wishes to claim missed deduction.
Computation.
Section 264 — assessee-friendly revision within 1 year of order.
File application; PCIT/CIT can revise downward (favourable).
No upward prejudice permitted under s.
264(1) — 'not being prejudicial'.
Result. Application for downward revision under s. 264.
Illustration — Illustration 2
Facts. Assessee filed appeal to CIT(A); now wishes to invoke s. 264 instead.
Computation.
Section 264(4)(b) — bar where appeal pending.
Withdraw appeal first (if procedurally permissible); then file s.
264 application.
Else both routes parallel.
Result. Withdraw appeal first; then s. 264.
Illustration — Illustration 3
Facts. Assessee fails to claim ICDS adjustment; wants s. 264 relief.
Computation.
Section 264(3) — within 1 year of communication.
PCIT/CIT discretion.
Hindustan Coca-Cola — equitable approach in genuine omission cases.
Result. Application within 1 year for omission.
Illustration — Illustration 4
Facts. Assessee's s. 264 application rejected; further remedy?
Computation.
Rejection order is itself revisable? No — Article 226 writ is the remedy.
PCIT/CIT order under s.
264 is not appealable.
Result. Article 226 writ — only remedy.
Illustration — Illustration 5
Facts. PCIT wishes to invoke s. 264 suo motu after 2 years of order.
Computation.
Section 264(2) — 1-year suo-motu limitation.
Beyond 1 year — barred.
Application by assessee under s.
264(3) is also 1 year.
Result. 1-year suo-motu bar.
PRACTITIONER PLANNING NOTES
■ Limitation discipline — diarise the 30 / 60 / 120 / 90-day clock from receipt of impugned order.
■ Section 249(4) — pay admitted tax (and 1% / 20% if applicable) before filing CIT(A) appeal.
■ Section 220(6) — apply for discretionary stay of demand pending CIT(A) decision (OM 29-2-2016: 20% pre-deposit benchmark).
■ Grounds of appeal — frame each ground specifically; avoid omnibus or sweeping grounds.
■ Statement of facts — chronologically present material facts and procedural history.
■ Paper-book — index, certified order, ITR, computation, replies, evidence.
■ Additional grounds — Rule 11 ITAT / s. 250(5) for CIT(A) — permissible if pure legal Q.
■ Rule 46A — admit additional evidence before CIT(A) only on the four narrow grounds.
■ Malabar Industrial discipline — for s. 263 revisionary challenges (twin-condition test).
■ Faceless Appeal — section 250(6B) machinery; VC hearing on request.
■ Cross-objections — Form 36A under ITAT Rules within 30 days of notice of appeal.
■ ITAT Rule 18 paper-book filing — minimum 7 days before hearing.
■ Substantial Q of law u/s 260A — formulate at the time of memo-of-appeal admission.
■ SLP under Article 136 — vs s. 261 appeal as of right with HC certificate (rare).
■ Department's monetary limit Circular — protective filing despite withdrawal-thresholds.
LITIGATION DEFENCE
■ Calcutta Discount — Article 226 writ for jurisdictional challenges where statutory remedy not efficacious.
■ Malabar Industrial — twin condition (erroneous + prejudicial) for s. 263; one-leg-only insufficient.
■ GKN Driveshafts — challenge order disposing s. 148 objections via writ before assessment.
■ Ashish Agarwal — reassessment-notice procedural defects defensible.
■ Vatika Township — prospective amendment for substantive provisions; FA timeline arguments.
■ Mathuram Agrawal — strict construction of charging / penal provisions.
■ K.P. Varghese — object-and-purpose interpretation.
■ Excel Industries — accrual / real-income doctrine in quantum appeals.
■ Reliance Petroproducts — bona-fide claim not concealment (for s. 271(1)(c) penalty appeals).
■ Dilip N. Shroff — penalty discretion exercise grounds.
■ BC Srinivasa Setty — failure of computation machinery as substantive defence.
■ Azadi Bachao — treaty interpretation in NR cases on appeal.
■ Section 273B — reasonable-cause defence to penalty appeals.
■ Limitation defence — appeal filed within statutory clock + COD application for delay.
■ Faceless appeal — section 250(6B) ground if no VC hearing granted on request.
■ Constitutional grounds — Article 14 / 19 / 265 in extreme arbitrariness cases.
STEP-BY-STEP PROCEDURE — 15 STEPS
Step 1. Receipt of adverse order
Diarise date of service for limitation.
Step 2. Computation of limitation
30 / 60 / 120 / 90 days from receipt or as per section.
Step 3. Section 220(6) stay application
If demand pending — file stay application before AO + CIT(A).
Step 4. Section 249(4) compliance
Pay admitted tax (+ 1% / 20% pre-deposit where applicable).
Step 5. Draft grounds of appeal
Each ground specific, separately numbered, supported by reasoning.
Step 6. Statement of facts
Chronological — procedural and substantive history.
Step 7. Compile paper-book
Index + impugned order + ITR + computation + replies + evidence.
Step 8. Form 35 / 36 filing
Online via e-filing portal (Form 35) or ITAT portal (Form 36).
Step 9. Pay appeal fee
Per section — Rs 250 / Rs 500 / Rs 1,000 / Rs 10,000.
Step 10. Acknowledgement & diary
Capture acknowledgement number and hearing-roster diary.
Step 11. Personal hearing
VC hearing under Faceless Appeal Scheme; physical hearing before ITAT/HC/SC.
Step 12. Written submissions
Detailed written submission + case-law compilation.
Step 13. Order disposal
Receive appellate order; analyse for further appeal / acceptance.
Step 14. Further appeal
If adverse on Q of law / facts — escalate to next forum within limitation.
Step 15. Section 244A refund / consequential
If favourable — claim refund with statutory interest; file consequential rectification.
PRACTITIONER CHECKLIST — 19 ITEMS
PRACTITIONER CHECKLIST
☐ Date of receipt of impugned order recorded.
☐ Limitation clock diarised (30 / 60 / 120 / 90 days).
☐ Section 249(4) admitted-tax pre-deposit paid.
☐ Section 220(6) stay application filed where demand outstanding.
☐ Form 35 / 36 prepared (online).
☐ Grounds of appeal — each ground specific and numbered.
☐ Statement of facts — chronologically detailed.
☐ Annexures — certified copy of impugned order.
☐ Annexures — ITR + computation + 26AS.
☐ Annexures — replies + evidence + supporting documents.
☐ Annexures — case-law compilation.
☐ Appeal fee paid as per slab.
☐ Section 250(6B) VC-hearing request marked.
☐ Cross-objection (if respondent) — Form 36A within 30 days.
☐ Rule 18 ITAT paper-book filed minimum 7 days before hearing.
☐ Additional grounds (if pure Q of law) under s. 250(5) / Rule 11 ITAT.
☐ Rule 46A additional evidence application (CIT(A)).
☐ Power of attorney / vakalatnama (where counsel appears).
☐ Acknowledgement preserved for monitoring.
CROSS-REFERENCES (28+)
CROSS-REFERENCES
▸ Section 246AAppealable orders — mutually exclusive.
▸ Section 249Form and time of appeal.
▸ Section 250 / 251CIT(A) framework.
▸ Section 253ITAT appeal — mutually exclusive.
▸ Section 254ITAT powers.
▸ Section 260A / 261HC / SC routes.
▸ Section 263Revenue-favour revision — inverse jurisdiction.
▸ Section 264AFaceless Revision Scheme.
▸ Section 143(3) / 144 / 147AO orders — subject matter.
▸ Section 144BFaceless Assessment overlay.
▸ Section 154Rectification — alternate route.
▸ Section 156Demand notice.
▸ Section 220(6)Stay of demand.
▸ Section 244ARefund interest on s. 264 relief.
▸ Section 271(1)(c) / 270APenalty — separately.
▸ Section 273BReasonable cause.
▸ Article 226 — ConstitutionWrit for s. 264 rejection.
▸ Article 14 — ConstitutionNatural justice.
▸ Hindustan Coca-Cola anchorEquitable approach.
▸ Sirpur Paper Mills (SC)Section 264 scope.
▸ Vijaya Bank (SC)PCIT discretion under s. 264.
▸ Mutual-exclusion principleSection 264(4) bar.
▸ CBDT Faceless Revision SchemeOperative framework.
▸ Section 144C — DRPSeparate route.
▸ Section 153A / 153CSearch assessments.
▸ Article 265 — ConstitutionNo tax without authority.
▸ Section 536 — ITA 2025Saves pending revisions.