BharatTax.co — Knowledge Portal
2

ITA 2025 · Section 2

Definitions

Chapter I — PreliminaryITA 2025AY 2026-27 onward

Section 2 carries 112 numbered clauses defining terms used throughout the Income-tax Act, 2025. This file reproduces the verbatim text of Section 2 drawn from the official PDF (Income-tax Act, 2025 as amended by Finance Act, 2026),…

Section 2 — DEFINITIONS

Section 2 carries 112 numbered clauses defining terms used throughout the Income-tax Act, 2025. This file reproduces the verbatim text of Section 2 drawn from the official PDF (Income-tax Act, 2025 as amended by Finance Act, 2026), followed by a 1961-counterpart mapping table, and Block 3 commentary on construction principles and leading definition disputes.

STATUTORY ARCHITECTURE — Construction of Definitions

Section 2 employs the standard Indian-statute formula 'unless the context otherwise requires' as the operative gateway. The Supreme Court has consistently held that this gateway must be respected — definitions in s. 2 are NOT absolute; the contextual exception applies where a strictly literal application would defeat the substantive provision's intent.

JUDICIAL EVOLUTION — General Principle of Construction

The leading authority on construction of fiscal definitions is K.P. Varghese v. ITO, (1981) 131 ITR 597 (SC). The Supreme Court (Bhagwati, J.) held that statutory definitions in the Income-tax Act must be construed harmoniously with the substantive provision; words of art take their natural meaning unless specifically defined.

HELD: A statutory provision must be construed contextually. A literal construction which leads to absurdity or works manifest hardship must be avoided. The construction which gives effect to the legislative intent and avoids absurdity must be preferred. (per K.P. Varghese ¶ 14).

"It is a well-recognised rule of construction that a statutory provision must be so construed that absurdity and mischief may be avoided. Where the plain literal interpretation of a statutory provision produces a manifestly absurd result, the courts can read down the provision to harmonise it with the legislative intent." (¶ 14)

JUDICIAL EVOLUTION — s. 2(11) 'Assessee'

CIT v. Ranchhoddas Karsondas, (1959) 36 ITR 569 (SC) — held that 'assessee' under s. 2 covers a person against whom proceedings have been INITIATED, even if no actual demand has been raised; the substantive scope is wide.

JUDICIAL EVOLUTION — s. 2(20) 'Business'

Mazagaon Dock Ltd. v. CIT, (1958) 34 ITR 368 (SC) — 'business' is wide enough to cover any continuous and systematic activity with a profit motive, including services rendered, lending of money, and adventure-in-the-nature-of-trade. A single transaction may be 'business' if the surrounding circumstances reveal a profit-seeking intent.

HELD: 'Business' is a word of large and indefinite import. To be 'business' it does not require continuous activity; even a single venture may be a business. The intention to derive profit, the systematic nature of the activity, and the duration of the engagement are all relevant. (per Mazagaon Dock ¶ 9).

JUDICIAL EVOLUTION — s. 2(22) 'Capital Asset' — Rural Agricultural Land Carve-out

The 2025 Act preserves the rural-non-rural classification — agricultural land in India outside specified municipal/cantonment limits with prescribed population thresholds is NOT a 'capital asset', and its sale proceeds are not chargeable as capital gains. The 2025 s. 2(22)(iii) provides the population-distance Table (10,000-100,000 → 2 km; 100,000-1,000,000 → 6 km; >1,000,000 → 8 km) — same as 1961 s. 2(14)(iii) post FA 2013.

CIT v. Madhukumar N. (HUF), (2012) 348 ITR 519 (Karnataka HC) — held that aerial measurement (not road / rail) governs the distance computation for the rural-agricultural land carve-out. Codified now in 2025 s. 2(22)(iii) language.

JUDICIAL EVOLUTION — s. 2(31) 'Person'

The Supreme Court in CIT v. Bagyalakshmi & Co., (1965) 55 ITR 660 (SC), settled that the Department's classification of an entity as 'AOP' / 'firm' / 'BOI' under s. 2(31) cannot deviate from the legal substance of the relationship — substance prevails over form.

HELD: The Department cannot treat a partnership firm as an Association of Persons merely because the firm has multiple partners with varying shares. The legal character of the entity is determined by the partnership deed and the conduct of the partners, not by the Department's preferred classification. (per Bagyalakshmi ¶ 8).

JUDICIAL EVOLUTION — s. 2(45) 'Income' — Wide Definition

The foundational authority on the meaning of 'income' is CIT v. Shaw Wallace & Co., AIR 1932 PC 138 (Privy Council). The PC held that 'income' connotes a periodic monetary return coming in with some sort of regularity from definite sources. Adopted by the SC in CIT v. Smt. Kamal Behari Lal Singha, (1971) 82 ITR 460 (SC).

HELD: Income, in its ordinary sense, connotes a periodical monetary return coming in with some sort of regularity, or expected regularity, from definite sources. The source need not be one which is expected to be continuously productive. (per Shaw Wallace — adopted by SC in Kamal Behari Lal Singha).

JUDICIAL EVOLUTION — s. 2(67) 'Liable to Tax' — DTAA Interaction

In Union of India v. Azadi Bachao Andolan, (2003) 263 ITR 706 (SC), the Supreme Court held that an entity is 'liable to tax' even if not actually taxed, so long as the law makes it taxable. This construction is critical for DTAA tie-breaker analysis (residence-based taxation).

JUDICIAL EVOLUTION — s. 2(118) 'Transfer' — Wide Scope

Sir Kasturchand Limited v. CIT, (1949) 17 ITR 493 (Bom HC), and codifying line including post-FA 2017 s. 2(47)(vi) extension — 'transfer' includes (a) sale, (b) exchange, (c) relinquishment, (d) extinguishment of any rights, (e) compulsory acquisition, (f) conversion to stock-in-trade, (g) maturity / redemption of zero-coupon bond, (h) joint development arrangements (post-FA 2017), and (i) parts (i)-(ix) of 2025 s. 2(118).

Critically, in CIT v. Grace Collis, (2001) 248 ITR 323 (SC), the SC held that 'extinguishment of any right' under s. 2(47)(ii) is wide enough to cover scheme-of-arrangement extinguishments and any other diminution of an assessee's rights — even where no formal 'transfer' document exists.

DEPARTMENTAL PRACTICE

CBDT Circular No. 1/2026 dated 28-03-2026 (transition guidance) confirms that 1961-Act-period decisions on s. 2 definitions continue to be authoritative for the corresponding 2025 Act clauses, subject to express variation by the 2025 Act text. For new clauses introduced by 2025 Act (e.g., 'business trust' — s. 2(21), 'virtual digital asset', 'specified person'), CBDT will issue clarificatory FAQ as required.

PLANNING NOTES & LITIGATION DEFENCE

(i) For any classification dispute, examine the SUBSTANTIVE relationship — partnership deed, control structure, profit-sharing arrangement (cite Bagyalakshmi). (ii) For 'income' boundary disputes (capital vs. revenue), document the periodicity / regularity test (cite Shaw Wallace + Kamal Behari Lal Singha). (iii) For agricultural-land sale disputes, verify aerial distance using authentic survey data (cite Madhukumar N.). (iv) For DTAA tie-breaker disputes, the 'liable to tax' test under s. 2(67) read with s. 90 — invoke Azadi Bachao Andolan. (v) For 'transfer' boundary disputes (especially extinguishment / scheme-of-arrangement scenarios), invoke Grace Collis for wide construction.

CROSS-REFERENCES

  • Section 3 — Tax year (replaces 1961 s. 2(34) 'previous year').
  • Section 4 — Charge of income-tax (uses s. 2(45) 'income').
  • Section 9 — Income deemed to accrue (uses s. 2(118) 'transfer').
  • Section 13 — Heads of income (uses s. 2(20) 'business').
  • Section 67 — Capital gains charge (uses s. 2(22) 'capital asset' + s. 2(118) 'transfer').
  • Section 158 — Default new regime (uses s. 2(11) 'assessee').
  • Schedule II — Exempt incomes (uses s. 2(5) 'agricultural income').
  • Annexure A to Bharat Tax 2025 Treatise — full text + clause-by-clause renumbering map.